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Abstract
This paper describes a procedure to enable
the planning of targeted measures to increase the
Information Security Awareness (ISA) of employees
of an institution.
The procedure is practically
applied at a German university. With the help of a
comprehensive analysis, which is based on findings of
social psychology, necessary topics for ISA measures
are identified. In addition, reasons are sought for why
employees do not conduct information security. The
procedure consists of a qualitative phase with interviews
and a quantitative phase with a questionnaire. It turned
out that the procedure provided many clues to the
design of ISA measures. These include organizational
and technical measures that can help employees to
ensure information-safe behavior. In addition, it was
found that there were deviations between the qualitative
and quantitative phases and therefore, both phases are
necessary. The paper critically discusses the procedure
and also addresses the strengths and weaknesses of the
analysis.

1.

Introduction

In the digital age, the importance of information
technology in companies and public institutions is
increasing. In addition to facilitating work processes,
digitization also creates challenges.
Ensuring the
security of information in particular is one of the
biggest concerns in this context [1]. Protection is
so important because information is now regarded as
an enterprise asset and thus has a direct influence
on business success [2]. The disclosure of sensitive
information such as research results or personal data
can lead to financial losses or negative effects of the
image of an institution. The governments of states
and countries have also recognized the high relevance
of information security. For example, the government
of the German federal state of Bavaria has enacted
an e-government law obliging public institutions to
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draw up an information security concept and to create
the technical and organizational prerequisites for its
implementation.
When it comes to increasing information security,
first and foremost technical measures are considered.
Anti-virus software or firewalls are classic technical
tools to protect information systems and an important
part of a defense strategy. Current studies show,
however, that attackers circumvent these technical
defense mechanisms by directly manipulating the
human factor in the system: The user who interacts with
the computer [3, 4].
With attacks like phishing, malware, and social
engineering these users are tricked to reveal their
password or to transfer large amounts of money by
using psychological tricks [5]. Organizational measures,
such as the existence of guidelines, can create the
necessary framework in companies and institutions to
help to prevent such attacks. However, users must also
be persuaded to comply with these regulations. The
research area Information Security Awareness (ISA)
deals with how people can be sensitized to behave in
accordance with information security regulations. To
raise ISA, measures are used which mainly aim at
increasing the knowledge of the users [6]. However, this
“One-Size-Fits-All” approach is not always effective. In
order to change the interaction of people with computers
in a targeted way, it is important to consider the
influencing factors that lead to a certain behavior. For
this purpose scientific findings of social psychology can
be used [7]. In addition, it is also important to consider
the individual situation in the company. For example,
if employees know the rules for a secure password
and still do not follow the rules, there is no point in
teaching them the rules again. In this case, one need
to look for other reasons for the prevailing behavior in
order to persuade employees to conform. In order to
implement such tailor-made training, a prior analysis
of the current situation is essential. Good preparation
increases the success of the measures and saves money,
as unnecessary measures are avoided.
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This paper presents the initial steps of an analysis
in preparation for an tailor-made ISA training. The
analysis was carried out at a German University of
Applied Sciences. Due to the Bavarian E-Government
Act, this university is obliged to develop an information
security concept. The analysis was part of a project
to implement the legal requirements. In the initial
qualitative phase of the analysis, interviews were
conducted with individual members of the organization.
This served to generate insights into how users are
confronted with information security in their daily
work and what they think about it. In the following
quantitative phase these impressions were taken up
in the context of a questionnaire, which this time
was addressed to all members of the organization and
examined. The Integrated Behavior Model (IBM) from
[8] is used as the basis for the procedure for the analysis
and theory of human behavior. The use of IBM in the
context of ISA was already motivated by [9]. This paper
begins with basics of the research field, followed by
an overview of related work. Afterwards we describe
our research approach. We then present the results of
the qualitative and quantitative analysis phases. These
results and the strengths and weaknesses of the analysis
are discussed afterwards. Finally, we give an outlook on
future research.

2.

Basics

The research area ISA targets the “human factor”
and how IT users can be brought to an information
security-compliant behavior. Users should be motivated
to use their theoretical knowledge about information
security in practice [10] and should be convinced of the
importance of their actions. Three possible perspectives
to ISA are described [11]:
1. Employees know, which threats exist and
recognize them (“perception”).
2. Employees further know, how to protect
themselves against threats (“protection”).
3. Employees know what a threat is, what they can
do about it and that they behave accordingly
(“behavior”).
Only employees that behave compliantly, described in
the third perspective, promise an actual increase in
information security within an institution or company.
ISA means that employees know how to behave in
compliance with information security (e.g., choosing
a secure password), what consequences they and the
company may face in the event of non-compliant
behavior (e.g., loss of image and financial loss due to

loss of customer data) and that they actually apply this
knowledge in critical situations. With the organization
an additional aspect of security awareness is named
by [12]. The organization ensures that employees in
the company are able to behave in compliance with
information security, i.e., no barriers exist, which are
in conflict with compliant behavior. For example, a
barrier is a password change link which is hidden in
the depths of the company’s intranet. At the same time,
organizational measures, such as increasing usability of
applications, can support information security.
The integrated behavioral model (IBM) [8] from
health psychology helps to explain human behavior. The
IBM was already interpreted in the context of ISA and
used to explain the mental construct Security Awareness
[9]. As shown in Figure 1 the ISA of a person is the
sum of the four factors knowledge and skills (“I know
how the behavior is performed”), habit (“I’m used to
perform the behavior”), salience (“The performance of
the behavior is in my mind”), and behavioral intent (“I
want to perform the behavior”). Especially the factor
behavioral intention is complex. It is formed by the
mental constructs Attitude, the Perceived Norm and
the Personal Agency of a person. These, in turn, are
formed by emotions and beliefs. In order to achieve
an information security-compliant behavior of a person
for a certain behavior, the four indicated factors must
be influenced. But even if the factors are perfectly
pronounced, environmental constraints can still prevent
the performance of the behavior. This clearly shows
that the environment is also decisively involved in the
behavioral formation of a human being. In addition,
the influence of environmental factors can also affect the
behavioral intention [8].

3.

Related Work

In the past, the analysis of ISA has already been
considered in various scientific papers. Kruger and
Kearney [13] use the Knowledge-Attitude-Behavior
(KAB) Model for their analysis. The KAB model
assumes that the three factors knowledge, attitude, and
behavior influence each other. The characteristics of
these three dimensions were tested in six areas relevant
to information security: adherence to guidelines,
password security, diligence in handling e-mails and
the Internet, diligence with mobile devices, reporting
security incidents and the awareness that actions are
followed by consequences.
The individual topic
areas were divided into several sub-areas.
Both
the dimensions and the subject areas were weighted
differently by the researchers.
By weighting the
individual dimensions and areas, different companies
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Figure 1. Factors of Behavior

can individually address the relevance of the dimensions
and subject areas. The measurement itself takes place
in the model using a questionnaire. Finally, the
evaluation of the questionnaire provides both results
of the respective dimension and subject areas as well
as an aggregated overall result as a percentage. Khan
et al. [14] proposes an approach for presenting the
actual security awareness in companies. These are,
for example, the number of helpdesk calls, the number
of accesses to unauthorized pages or the evaluation of
questionnaires that query knowledge on the subject of
information security. Khan et al. [14] also recommend
the use of questionnaires, but use the result as only
one of several key figures. The remaining indicators
are collected in real business operations and show how
employees behave regardless of the level of knowledge.

4.

Research Approach

This work distinguishes itself from the analysis
methods presented in the section Related Work, which
primarily aim to make ISA measurable. The aim of
this paper is to determine the reasons for a specific
behavior and to derive contents for targeted measures
in a later ISA-training. It should also be examined
whether different target groups have to be distinguished.
In addition, first experiences with the procedure for
analysis should be gained. It should be examined
whether the results of the qualitative and quantitative
part differ from each other and which advantages and

disadvantages arise from the use of the method. For this,
we chose the following research approach.
The current study is part of a project to introduce
an information security management system (ISMS)
at a German university. The general procedure of
the project is based on the ISMS-Framework ISIS12
[15]. ISIS12 reduces the detailed and widespread
standard IT-Grundschutz of the German Federal Office
for Information Security (BSI) to measures that meet the
requirements of small and medium-sized enterprises. It
is also recommended for authorities. At the time of the
survey, the university employed a total of 1079 staff.
Employees at the university are a particularly important
group in terms of information security awareness. They
work with sensitive data, like personal data of students,
and systems on a daily basis, making them a target
for potential attackers as well as an important defense
against various attacks.
The process performed for the analysis is based on
the approach used by [8] to use the IBM in the field
of health psychology. As seen in Figure 2 the scope
was set initially by identifying the relevant topics that
needed to be investigated. This was followed by a
qualitative analysis which was carried out in the form of
interviews. The interviews were subsequently analyzed
and hypotheses were defined from the findings. These
hypotheses were used in the quantitative analysis to
develop questionnaires completed by the members of
the university. The results of the questionnaires were
also analyzed later to identify the content that needs to
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• Workplace: Locking of the screen when leaving
the workplace. Locking of work documents when
leaving the workplace.
From these behaviors, the questions for the qualitative
analysis were derived. Before the actual analysis, the
procedure was coordinated with the staff council.

5.

Figure 2. Process of Analysis

be addressed in a future campaign.
The investigation was carried out in the period May
2017 to March 2018. Since the later measures should
aim all members of the university, it was necessary to
include all subgroups of this broad target group in the
analysis. The employees divide into the academic staff /
lecturers, technical staff, administrative staff and others,
which is mainly composed of external lecturers.
As a further preparatory action, the individual
information security issues were identified, which
should be considered in the analysis. For this purpose,
in the first step, the 53 IT-Grundschutz measures listed
in ISIS12 were selected in which a human factor
is involved.
These were discussed together with
the responsible persons of the IT department of the
university. Measures that were not relevant for the
university were removed. The individual measures were
arranged thematically and finally grouped into subject
areas. In the following, these topics and the focused
behaviors are enumerated.
• Passwords: Choosing a secure password for the
university account. Periodical change of the
password.
• Mobile devices: Use authentication methods for
mobile devices used for business applications.
• Information exchange: No use of removable
media (eg USB flash drives).
• E-mails: Detection of malicious e-mails. Use of
certificates for secure communication.

Qualitative Phase

The qualitative analysis was carried out in the form
of interviews. In a first step, we determined departments
and faculties of the university from as different areas of
expertise as possible. The intention was to diversify the
interview partners and provide insights into the various
departments. Different representatives of the scientific,
technical and administrative staff should be involved. In
order to find interview partners, the superiors were sent
an informative e-mail. The superiors in turn specifically
asked their employees to participate in the interviews
and passed on the names of the interested parties. In
this way, 20 employees were persuaded to voluntarily
participate in the qualitative analysis. The interviews
were conducted between July 24, 2017 and November
14, 2017. The interviews were recorded with the
prior consent of the participants in order to be able to
evaluate them more easily later. The recordings were
analyzed during the evaluation. In order to gain useful
insights on the intention to behave and also to analyze
the reasons for a certain behavior, we paid attention
to questioning and collecting convictions and emotions
about the respective behavior in the interviews.
In the area of “passwords”, it was found that the
interviewed employees attach importance to choosing
a secure password for the university account. When
presenting different passwords, the participants were
also able to identify those that correspond most
closely to the current recommendations for passwords.
The interviewees were more likely to have problems
changing a password. The majority of the participants
said they do not change their password. A few
participants did not even change the initial password
provided at the beginning of their career. The employees
know that it is security relevant, but still do not do it.
Two barriers were particularly noticeable here: Many
employees find it difficult to remember new passwords.
Almost all of them therefore wanted support, such as
wishing to have a password manager. The second barrier
is that many of the employees do not know how and
where to change the password. Almost no one knew
the university’s requirements for the design of secure
passwords.
In the area of “mobile devices”, we learned that
both private and business devices are used in the
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Figure 3. In my opinion, the following passwords are hard to break or to guess.

university environment. The most frequently used
business application is the retrieval of business e-mails.
The devices are secured with a PIN or fingerprint for
most employees.
The participants indicated that they use external
removable media, especially USB flash drives, at the
workplace. The flash drives mostly are from students
who want to transfer or print documents. Some were
aware of the dangers this poses, but not all. On the
contrary, lack of alternatives and convenience were
identified as reasons for use.
In the case of malicious e-mails, most employees
stated that they manually checked whether an e-mail
was potentially dangerous (sender, file type, etc.).
Potentially dangerous file formats in attachments, such
as .exe, were identified by most employees. The rest
rely on technical verification by an anti-virus software
or the mail program. Few employees were aware of
certificates for secure e-mail communications and only
one respondent used a certificate.
Approximately half of respondents said they
deliberately used the screen lock when leaving their
workplace. The other half said that they either rarely or
never do so. This second half saw no danger from their
behavior. “There is no one else in my office” or “I have
not stored any important data” are statements that were
made in the process. Some of the employees leave their
work documents on the desk (“Nobody comes in here
anyway”). The other part locks sensitive documents in a
cabinet. But not everyone has this option.

6.

Quantitative Phase

The quantitative analysis was carried out with an
online questionnaire. The questionnaire was designed
on the basis of the previous interviews. For this
purpose, the described findings were reformulated into
assumptions, which in turn were used to formulate the
questions. With this we wanted to investigate whether
the insights gained were also an important topic in the
university as a whole. The questions were grouped
into the different topic blocks. In addition to the
usual topics, we also asked for statistical data. The
response options for the questions were individually
adapted to the character of the question. Most of
the questions could be answered on a Likert scale
for measuring personal attitudes. Participants had five
possible answers: “I fully agree”, “I rather agree”,
“I neither agree nor disagree”, “I rather disagree”,
and “I strongly disagree”. Alternatively, for some
questions a sixth answer possibility was given with
“Don’t know”. Some questions could also be answered
with “Yes” or “No” or with different answer options
to query knowledge. The statistical data also asked
about the age group and the employee group. The staff
groups were divided into scientific staff, technical staff,
administrative staff and other. For each topic block, the
participants also had the opportunity to leave comments
in a text field.
The employee survey started on December 13, 2017
and was available until December 22, 2017. In advance,
all employees were invited to take part in the survey

Page 6542

Table 1. Results of the quantitative Analysis (5 = I fully agree, 1 = I strongly disagree)

ID
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6
P7
M1
M2
I1
I2
I3
E1
E2
E3
E4
W1

W2

W3

W4
W5

Statement
It is important for me choosing secure passwords
for all applications I use within the university.
(n = 331)
I know the password policy of the university.
(n = 330)
I’m still using the password, I received at the
beginning of my studies for university applications.
(n = 331)
I change my university password regularly (e.g.,
once a year). (n = 237)
I think it is difficult to remember new passwords.
(n = 330)
I would appreciate support regarding the
memorization of passwords. (n = 331)
I know how to change my university password.
(n = 330)
I check the e-mails of my university address with
my private smartphone / tablet. (n = 312)
I secure all my mobile devices (whether business
or private) with a PIN, password, fingerprint or
Face ID. (n = 247)
I use USB drives/external hard drives that belong
to other persons at my workplace. (n = 319)
I don’t have issues with using USB drives/external
hard drives other persons gave me. (n = 319)
I use the university cloud to store and exchange
data. (n = 318)
I’m sure that malicious e-mails are recognized by
my anti-virus programme. (n = 315)
I examine unexpected mails for signs of being
potentially harmful. (n = 315)
I know that I can encrypt e-mails with a certificate.
(n = 315)
I have requested a certificate for encrypting /
signing e-mails. (n = 71)
I always lock my screen, even if I leave my
workplace only for a short period of time.
(n = 313)
Locking the screen,is unnecessary to lock the
screen, because nobody has access to the office.
(n = 313)
Locking the screen is unnecessary because I
don’t have any important data on my computer/
notebook. (n = 313)
I always lock documents with important /
sensitive information in a closet when leaving
my workplace. (n = 313)
I do not have the option to lock documents away.
(n = 63)

2

1

Don’t
Yes
know

No

50% 41% 3%

4%

1%

1%

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

1%

30% 69%

-

-

-

-

-

2%

16% 82%

5

4

3

10% 26% 13% 36% 15% -

-

-

26% 33% 13% 18% 10% -

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

14%

35% 51%

-

-

-

-

-

23%

60% 17%

-

-

-

-

-

-

62% 38%

-

-

-

-

-

-

83% 17%

12% 23% 10% 29% 26% -

-

-

4%

16% 11% 34% 35% -

-

-

17% 19% 10% 15% 39% -

-

-

11% 41% 19% 20% 9%

-

-

-

73% 23% 1%

-

-

-

11% 12% 11% 27% 39% -

-

-

-

30% 69%

-

-

42% 25% 7%

2%

-

1%

-

1%

14% 11% 1%

-

-

6%

13% 10% 19% 52% -

-

-

1%

4%

-

-

-

9%

21% 65% -

38% 26% 16% 15% 5%

-

-

-

-

29% 71%

-

-

-

-
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Figure 4. The USB drives / external hard drives predominantly belong to.

by e-mail. The deans of the faculties were contacted
separately by the information security officer in order
to encourage their employees to take part. 305 surveys
were completed in full and 47 in part. With a total of
352 people, this corresponds to a response rate of 32.62
%. The detailed results of the survey are shown in Table
1. The following text refers to the ID of the respective
statement.
The questionnaire confirmed that employees value
secure passwords. 91 % of the participants agreed (P1).
In addition, a large proportion of the questionnaires were
able to identify passwords that comply with the current
password rules (cf. Figure 3). In the questionnaire, 69
% gave an negative answer to the question of whether
the employees knew the university’s specifications for
passwords (P2). In addition, 16 % of the employees still
used their initial password (P3). But even for employees
who have changed their initial password, it is rather
unusual to change their password regularly afterwards.
Only 36 % said they would become active here (P4).
60 % also said that they know where to change their
password (P7). 59 % of employees said they had trouble
remembering a password (P5). However, only 35 %
require assistance with this (P6).
In the area of mobile devices, 62 % of employees
used private devices to retrieve business e-mails (M1).
17 % of employees do not secure their mobile devices
with an authentication method (M2).
In the area of information exchange, 69 % of
employees have concerns about using removable media
from other people (I2). 35 percent stated that they
regularly use removable media from other people (I1).
As seen in Figure 4 in most cases the flash drives belong
to students (55 %), but also to other employees (39 %).
The university’s own alternative to data exchange (cloud
solution) is used by 36 % of the participants (I3).
In the e-mail sector, 52 % of employees rely on
anti-virus software to detect malicious e-mails (E1).

As seen in Figure 5 a large proportion identified files
ending with *.exe (90 %) and *.zip (77 %) as potentially
dangerous attachments for e-mails. However, only 45
% consider *.doc to be dangerous. With 96 percent a
a large proportion of the staff agrees, that they examine
unexpected mails for signs of being potentially harmful
(E2). In addition, only 23 % of employees know that
a certificate for e-mails can be applied for to encrypt
e-mails (E3). However, only 30 % of these people
actually applied for a certificate to encrypt e-mails (E4).
While in the qualitative analysis only about half of
the respondents stated that they lock the screen of their
computer, 67 % said in the questionnaire that they lock
the screen when leaving their workplace for a short
time (W1). The conviction gained from the qualitative
analysis “The locking of the screen is unnecessary
because nobody but me and my office colleagues comes
to my workplace anyway” is only agreed by 19 % of
the respondents (W2). The conviction “The locking of
the screen is unnecessary, because I have no important
data on my computer” was agreed by only 5 % of
the participants (W3). In the questionnaire, 20 % of
respondents said they did not lock sensitive documents
away (W4). Only 30 % of this group said they have no
cabinet to lock them away (W5).

7.

Discussion

The analysis could provide valuable insights for the
development and design of awareness measures for the
university. Surprising was that many of the behaviors
investigated could be improved by organizational and
technical solutions. The IBM shows that barriers at
the workplace can have an effect on the intention to
behave in terms of behavior (cf. [9]). In the area
of passwords, it was shown that most employees are
familiar with the recommendations for password design
and that it is, therefore, not necessary to prioritize the
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Figure 5. E-mail attachments with the following endings are potentially dangerous and should not be opened
without hesitation. (Multiple answer allowed.)

topic passwords. Since, not any university specifications
were known, the development of guidelines should
be initiated. It could be helpful to orient on the
new recommendations for passwords of the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [16].
Following the recommendations, newly selected and
existing passwords are compared with a blacklist of
insecure passwords. This investigation can also be
used to check whether initial passwords are still being
used. If the respective password appears in the list,
the user receives a message asking him to change the
password. In order to facilitate the password change,
the necessary steps to change the password can be
explained to the user in the message. Since some
employees had requested assistance in remembering
passwords, a password manager should be procured for
voluntary use. Barriers were identified when reviewing
the certificate application process following the survey.
Instead of asking users to identify themselves at a
central location away from the employees’ workplaces,
on-site appointments could be arranged where several
employees can confirm their identity at once. In
addition, additional cabinets should be bought to lock
documents away for those who need it.
In the case of some types of behavior, the potential
danger of noncompliance must be pointed out in
order to influence the employees’ intention to behave.
Employees must be convinced of the relevance of
business e-mail addresses in order to secure access
to private mobile devices. The outgoing dangers of

exposed documents and removable media like USB flash
drives must also be clarified in order to influence the
intention to behave. The cloud is already a technical
solution for bypassing removable media. This solution
is accessible not only to employees but also to students.
In order to make this service salient, advertising for
the cloud should be intensified in the future. In the
area of e-mail, the main aim is to increase knowledge.
Although the employees told us that they investigate
suspicious e-mails, our analysis did not ask for any
characteristics they check. Various incidents of phishing
attacks in the time after the analysis showed success
with only a few employees, but had major consequences.
For this reason, employees need to be trained in this
topic. Knowledge must also be imparted with regard to
the process of integrating a certificate for secure e-mail
communication. A simple manual could be designed
for this purpose, which is now made available to the
employees. Why the employees do not use a screen lock
could not be determined in the analysis and will have to
be determined in the future. For this behavior it is also
a good idea to practice the habit of locking the screen
with shortcuts on the keyboard.
The division of the analysis into a qualitative and a
quantitative part has proved its worth. On the one hand,
the real urgency of a topic could be determined. On the
other hand, the quantitative part also showed differences
to the findings of the qualitative part. While the
employees strongly demanded a password manager in
the interviews, only a small part of the employees asked
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for help in the questionnaire. In addition, the interview
participants were significantly more active in locking
mobile devices than the questionnaire participants.
Moreover, the quantitative analysis did not confirm
the convictions expressed in the interviews as to why
employees do not lock their screens. In addition, the
lack of lockable cabinets was not reflected as much in
the quantitative analysis as the interviews suggested.
Overall, the approach provided many clues for the
design of ISA measures. The analysis also provided
very targeted and individual insights, which can be
used specifically in the context of the university.
Otherwise, increasing knowledge might have been the
only measure taken. However, the results show how
diverse the reasons for a behavior can be.
The
use of IBM also made it possible to classify the
various factors influencing human behavior.
The
involvement of employees in the topic also created
an advertising effect for information security at the
university and increased interest. However, there
were also some weaknesses. On the one hand the
analysis is very time-consuming, since the interviews
must be accomplished and terminated. In addition it
happened that important questions were not questioned
in the quantitative analysis, because they were not
considered necessary by the qualitative analysis. After
the interviews, for example, it was assumed that mobile
devices would be widely locked with authentication
methods. Therefore, we never asked for reasons for
not using authentication methods in the questionnaire.
In the case of computer screen locking, beliefs gained
in the interviews were not confirmed later in the
quantitative analysis. Therefore, we never asked for
other beliefs towards the behavior.

8.

Outlook

The methodology presented in this paper describes
the first practical trial of our approach to preparing a
tailor-made ISA training. Many useful lessons have
been learned for planning such actions. Whether these
measures also promise the hoped-for success, must be
examined in our further research. A good way of doing
this is by taking a second survey after the measures
have been completed. Future analyses should focus
on gaining even more insights for the reasons of the
performance of a certain behavior. Due to the broad
range of behaviors, this was not possible in depth here.
In addition, it will be necessary to examine whether
participants in interviews or surveys are trying to be
particularly exemplary. This could lead to distorted
response tendencies (cf. [17]. This is only possible if the
findings are substantiated with further key figures. Such

an indicator could, for example, be a supplementary
check of the password database to determine how many
initial passwords are actually contained. In addition,
research should be conducted into how the cost of
qualitative analysis could be reduced in the future. By
repeatedly using the interviews in different companies,
it might be possible to generate a catalogue of different
beliefs that would minimize the search for causes in the
interviews in the future.

9.

Acknowledgments
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